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Abstract. Revelation principle implies that given any admissible social welfare func-
tion, the outcome of Baron and Myerson’s (1982) (BM) optimal direct-revelation mech-
anism under incentive constraints cannot be dominated by any other mechanism in
expected utilities. However, since the expected total surplus varies with a change in
the social welfare function, Pareto improvements should be possible if the monopo-
list and consumers can agree, by means of side payments that reveal no additional
information to the regulator, on the use of an alternative social welfare function which
would generate a lower expected deadweight loss. We check the validity of this intu-
ition by integrating the BM mechanism with an induced cooperative bargaining model
where unilateral pre-donation by consumers or the producer is allowed. Under this
new mechanism producer’s pre-donation in the ex-ante stage always leads to ex-ante
Pareto improvement while a certain amount of it completely eliminates the expected
deadweight loss. Moreover, if optimally designed in the interim stage, the producer’s
pre-donation may also lead under some cost parameters to interim (and also ex-post)
Pareto improvement. Consumers, on the other hand, have no incentive to make a
unilateral pre-donation, nor to reverse the optimal pre-donation of the monopolist.
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A seminal paper by Baron and Myerson (1982) (henceforth, BM) shows that a monop-
olist with unknown costs can be optimally regulated by a direct-revelation mechanism
which cannot be dominated by any other mechanism in terms of the expected welfare
distribution. However, since the expected total surplus implied by their mechanism
varies with a change in the expected social welfare function, intuition suggests that
Pareto improvements may be possible if the monopolist and consumers can agree, by
means of side payments, on the use of an alternative social welfare function which
would generate a lower expected deadweight loss. In this paper, we check the validity
of this intuition by integrating the BM mechanism with an induced cooperative bar-
gaining model that allows unilateral pre-donation by consumers or the producer. To
explain this integrated mechanism and what it can achieve in more detail, we shall
briefly re-introduce below the regulation problem considered by BM along with their
solution.
Using the Revelation Principle (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin, 1979; Myerson,
1979; Harris and Townsend, 1981), BM restrict themselves, for monopoly regulation,
to direct revelation mechanisms that ask the monopolist to report its unknown cost
parameter and that give it no incentive to lie. Using such mechanisms, BM calculate,
on behalf of a benevolent and computationally able regulator, the smallest individually-
rational subsidy that must be offered by consumers, at each value of the cost parameter,
to the monopolist in order to induce it to truthful revelation. The information about
this subsidy function allows the regulator to calculate the welfare of the monopolist
(operating profit plus the subsidy received) and the welfare of consumers (consumer
surplus net of the subsidy) as a function of the monopolist’s possible cost reports. BM
brings together these two welfare functions, representing the conflicting interests of
the two parties, under a generalized social welfare function, an important novelty for
the regulation literature at the time. Formally, they define the ex-post social welfare
function as the sum of consumer welfare and a fraction of the producer welfare. Given
the regulator’s incomplete information represented by a commonly known prior belief
about the unknown cost parameter, BM assume that the regulator’s task is to maximize
the expected value of the ex-post social welfare over the set of cost reports ensuring
the operation of the monopolist.
The Bayesian approach thus introduced by BM to the regulation literature is in-
dispensable, as it was immediately revealed by their regulatory solution that there
can exist no feasible direct-revelation mechanism that can maximize the ex-post social
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welfare function unless this function treats consumers and the monopolist equally. In
this restrictive case, the optimal regulatory solution that ensures marginal cost pricing
coincides (in terms of the welfare allocation) with the earlier solution of Loeb and Ma-
gat (1979) (henceforth, LM) achieved by the use of a delegation mechanism where the
monopolist is entitled, through an output dependent subsidy scheme, the sole right to
the whole economic surplus at the output it is delegated to choose. This solution by
LM, however, cannot be optimal when the social welfare function is of an asymmetric
form assigning to the welfare of the monopolist a weight less than one. The reason is
that marginal cost pricing would then lead to a suboptimally high level of subsidy, both
in the LM and BM model, which would reduce the actual (and expected) social welfare
below a level that is inevitable. The solution proposed by BM under these asymmet-
ric forms of welfare functions requires the price of the good to be always above the
marginal cost of the monopolist in order to limit the subsidy paid to the monopolist,
hence its informational rent (the producer welfare).
In this study, we ask whether we can obtain a regulatory outcome which is Pareto
superior to that of BM in terms of the expected or actual welfare distribution. Notice
that this question is not necessarily invalidated by the Revelation Principle, which, for
our problem, would state that if a socially efficient allocation rule (maximizing a given
social welfare function at each cost parameter) can be implemented by an arbitrary
mechanism, then the same rule can be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct
mechanism. This principle merely implies that once we fix an expected social welfare
function in the BM model of regulation where the welfare weights of the producer
and consumers are pre-determined and do not change during the regulatory process,
no mechanism of any form can generate a higher expected social welfare than the
direct revelation mechanism of BM. An implication of this result is that the welfare
allocations that correspond to different (expected) social welfare functions cannot be
Pareto ranked, further implying that the regulator cannot have any meta preference or
ranking over the set of possible social welfare functions when she tries to construct such
a preference comparing the welfare allocations induced by the BM mechanism. Clearly,
if she had such a meta preference, the optimality of the regulatory mechanism would
require the regulator to select the best social welfare function in terms of the induced
welfare allocation and announce it as part of the mechanism before the regulatory
action takes place. The regulator’s lack of a meta preference over the set of social
welfare functions should not mean, however, a complete impartialness for her or the
society on whose behalf she acts. Under the BMmechanism, the expected total surplus,
or the equally weighted sum of the producer’s and consumers’ welfares, does vary with
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a change in the social welfare function. Therefore, ex-ante Pareto improvements should
generally be possible if the monopolist and consumers can agree –by means of some
constant side payments that will not harm the incentive-compatibility constraints– on
the use of an alternative social welfare function that generates a lower deadweight loss
than predicted by the BM model.
The desired Pareto improvements over the outcome of the BM mechanism can be
achieved only if the superior mechanism we are looking for may yield welfare alloca-
tions that are not attainable by the BM mechanism. Aiming to explore such a superior
mechanism, we will augment the BM mechanism with some additional elements that
will map, with the help of some pre-committed side payments decided upon by con-
sumers or the monopolist, each social welfare function that can be (initially) chosen by
the regulator in the BM mechanism to a new social welfare function that will be used
in the augmented mechanism. The resulting regulatory mechanism will be incentive-
compatible, like the BM mechanism, only if the regulator can perfectly commit not to
use any additional information revealed by the augmented mechanism to update her
prior beliefs about the monopolist’s private cost. We will show that in some informa-
tional situations, we do not even need this commitment on the part of the regulator
since the augmented mechanism would reveal no additional information to the regula-
tor than she would already observe under the BM mechanism. To understand why the
outcome of the augmented mechanism may Pareto dominate the original mechanism,
we should note that our results could alternatively be obtained in a setup where the
monopolist could effectively bribe (incentivize) consumers to authorize the regulator
to value the monopolist’s profit more highly than she truly does. The regulator’s in-
creased effective concern with the monopolist’s profit would lead her to implement
smaller output distortions. The more limited distortions would in turn reduce dead-
weight loss. The increase in total surplus, coupled with ex- ante transfer payments from
the monopolist to consumers, could admit Pareto gains. Here, we should acknowledge
that the very idea that the social welfare can be increased when a policy-maker (or a
regulator) commits herself to maximize an objective that differs from her true objective
was first proposed –to the best of our best knowledge– by Besanko and Spulber (1993)
within the context of a horizontal merger in a Betrand duopoly. Our paper shows that
this idea can also be extended to the context of monopoly regulation with the help of
a bargaining model with pre-donations.
In more detail, we make the aforementioned augmentation or modification to the
BM mechanism by adding, prior to the revelation of the cost information, an initial
stage involving a cooperative bargaining game between consumers and the monopolist
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over the possible regulatory outcomes, hence over the possible social welfare functions,
under the possibility of pre-donation. We model this cooperative bargaining game
as in Saglam (2021), who shows that the BM model of regulation is isomorphic to a
cooperative bargaining problem a la Nash (1950) with appropriate elements. On the
other hand, we borrow our insight as to the potential welfare benefits of pre-donation
in a Pareto sense from a literature pioneered by Sertel (1992), who shows that in simple
bargaining problems (where the bargaining set has a linear frontier) the two-person
Nash bargaining rule can be manipulated via pre-donations: the bargaining party
with the higher valuation can alter the bargaining set always to its benefit.1 A more
recent work by Akin et al. (2011) in the same direction even shows that in simple
n-person bargaining problems the manipulation of Kalai-Smorodisnky rule through
pre-donation may lead to (strong) Pareto improvements. Motivated by these results,
we aim to explore whether a modified mechanism bringing the regulatory bargaining
idea of Saglam (2021) and the pre-donation idea of Sertel (1992) together may lead to
Pareto improvements over the BM mechanism.
Since the utilities in the bargaining setup of Nash (1950), and accordingly in Saglam
(2021), are von Neumann-Morgenstern (expected) utilities, any Pareto improvement
which may be deduced by only inspecting the effect of pre-donation on bargaining solu-
tions is bound to be an ex-ante improvement, defined in expected utilities. However, we
will also deal with ex-post improvements. To make both types of improvements mean-
ingful for the monopolist, we will consider two informational stages in our extended
regulatory model. The first stage is called the ex-ante stage where the monopolist has
not learned yet the actual value of its cost parameter and shares the regulator’s beliefs
about it. The second stage is the interim stage where the monopolist privately knows
the actual value of its cost parameter. Associated with these two stages, our model will
have two variants, depending upon whether pre-donations occur in the ex-ante stage
or the interim stage. However, we will retain the assumption from the BM model
that information revelation will occur in the interim stage. We will also assume that
both the monopolist and consumers will be informed by the regulator as to the details
of the regulatory mechanism at the beginning of the stage they are allowed to make
pre-donation. Given these assumptions, we observe that if consumers should decide
whether and how much to pre-donate in the ex-ante or interim stage (which they can
never distinguish from each other based on their own information in the model), they
should always consider the maximization of their ex-ante payoffs. On the other hand,
1For more in this literature, see Sertel and Orbay (1998), Orbay (2003), Akyol (2008), Akin et al.
(2011), among others.
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the producer should take into account its ex-ante payoff if it makes pre-donation de-
cisions in the ex-ante stage and its interim or equivalently ex-post payoff if it makes
these decisions in the interim stage.
We show that any amount of pre-donation made by the producer in the ex-ante
stage always leads to ex-ante Pareto improvement in the welfare allocation while a
certain amount of it completely eliminates the expected deadweight loss. Moreover,
pre-donation in the ex-ante stage reveals no information about the producer’s private
costs, hence it creates no commitment problem on the part of the regulator. We also
show that the pre-donation of the producer, if optimally designed in the interim stage,
may also lead under some cost parameters to ex-post Pareto improvement. Since the
optimal pre-donation of the producer is not independent of its private cost information
in the interim stage, the producer unintentionally reveals some part of this information
regardless whether it chooses to pre-donate or not. However, since the producer can
always commit to pre-donation functions that will increase the expected utility of
consumers and since such increases would be verifiable before the cost revelation occurs,
a benevolent regulator may find it beneficial to perfectly commit ex-ante not to use the
information that would be revealed by pre-donation to update her prior beliefs about
the producer’s private cost information. Such commitment is in the spirit of Loeb and
Magat’s (1979) analysis in which the regulator can make binding commitments before
the firm becomes privately informed about its cost. Finally, we show that consumers
have no incentive to make a unilateral pre-donation, nor to reverse the optimal pre-
donation of the producer.
While the idea of bargaining with pre-donation in the context of incentive regulation
is novel to our paper, unmediated negotiations are frequently observed in regulatory
practice. For instance, Littlechild (2009) shows how stipulated settlements replaced or
supplemented, in the past, the process of litigation in Florida. He reports that during
the period 1976-2002, 30 percent of earnings in the telephone, gas, and electricity
sectors were settled by stipulations between the public utilities and the Office of Public
Counsel (the Consumer Advocate). These settlements or negotiations took place, like
pre-donations in our model, without requiring the presence or the signature of the
regulatory body (Florida Public Service Commission) and without any public record
in many cases. Moreover, the stipulations usually brought rate reductions, much like
the price decreases under the firm-optimal pre-donation in our model.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic struc-
2In fact, Littlechild (2009) shows that the mean value of a rate reduction was eight times larger
with a stipulation than without, while the median value was more than 50 times larger.
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tures, Section 3 presents our results, and finally Section 4 concludes.
2 Basic Structures
Consider a monopolist producing a single good under the inverse demand function
P (q) = a− q, (1)
where a > 0. The monopolist is subject to a cost function
C(q, θ) = θq if q > 0 and C(0, θ) = 0, (2)
where q ≥ 0 denotes the quantity of supply and θ ∈ [0, a) denotes the constant marginal
cost which is privately known by the monopolist. On the other hand, the support of θ,
the demand parameter a as well as the form of the inverse demand and cost functions
described are common knowledge.
The monopolist is optimally regulated by a benevolent regulator who believes that
the private cost parameter of the monopolist is uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, a) according to the probability density function f(θ) such that f(θ) = 1/a if θ ∈
[0, a) and f(θ) = 0 otherwise. The problem facing the regulator is to choose the optimal
price of the good to maximize the expected social welfare under her beliefs. We should
notice that the regulatory structure described above simplifies the structure considered
by Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the cost function is affinely linear, involving
a fixed part as well, whereas the inverse demand function and the regulator’s beliefs
are not restricted to any specific forms. While we make our simplifications for the sake
of clarity and tractability; it will become clear throughout our analysis that our results
can be extended to other forms of regulatory structures, as well.
The solution to the regulatory problem we have described above is proposed by BM
in their more general structure. According to this solution, the regulator can, with no
loss of generality, restrict herself to incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanisms
that ask the producer to report its parameter θ and that gives the producer no incentive
for lying. These mechanisms involve functions 〈p(.), q(.), r(.), s(.)〉 such that when θ̃
is the cost report of the monopolist, p(θ̃) and q(θ̃) become the price and quantity
satisfying p(θ̃) = a−q(θ̃), r(θ̃) becomes the probability that the regulated monopolist is
allowed to produce and sell, and s(θ̃) becomes the expected subsidy paid by consumers
to the monopolist to ensure a truthful response.
Given a mechanism 〈p(.), q(.), r(.), s(.)〉, if the monopolist with the true marginal
cost θ submits the cost report θ̃, it obtains the regulated profit π(θ̃, θ) = [p(θ̃)q(θ̃) −
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θq(θ̃)]r(θ) + s(θ̃). This mechanism is called feasible if (i) it is incentive-compatible;
i.e. π(θ) ≡ π(θ, θ) ≥ π(θ̃, θ) for all θ, θ̃ ∈ [0, a) and (ii) it is individual rational;
i.e., π(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [0, a). The first condition implies that the function q(.) is






















Given π(θ) and CW (θ), the actual social welfare can be defined, as in the BM model,
by the equation
SW (θ) = CW (θ) + απ(θ), (6)
where α is a fixed parameter in [0, 1]. The problem facing the regulator is to find a
















We can observe from the above equation along with (3) that any mechanism max-
imizing SW e must yield π(a) = 0. To completely characterize this mechanism, we
can modify the optimal mechanism of BM for the special forms of demand, cost, and
belief functions in our model. This modification results in the optimal mechanism
〈p∗(.), q∗(.), r∗(.), s∗(.)〉 satisfying
p∗(θ) = (2− α)θ (8)














q∗(x)r∗(x)dx+ [θq∗(θ)− p∗(θ)q∗(θ)]r∗(θ) (11)
for all θ ∈ [0, a). The above mechanism yields to the producer the actual welfare given
by









θ2 − aθ + a
2
2(2− α) , (12)
if θ ∈ [0, θ∗(α)) and π(θ, α) = 0 otherwise. On the other hand, the consumer welfare
would become




(a− x)dx− θq∗(x, α)
]
r∗(θ)− π(θ, α)








θ2 + aθ − a
2
2(2− α) (13)
if θ ∈ [0, θ∗(α)) and CW (θ, α) = 0 otherwise. From the viewpoint of consumers and
the regulator, the above welfares are unknown before θ is revealed by the producer.














respectively. Notice that the pair (CW e(α), PW e(α)) denotes the expected welfare
(utility) distribution generated by the BM mechanism when the producer welfare is
weighted by α in the social welfare function. We will denote this pair simply by W (α).
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Likewise, we will henceforth denote p∗(θ), q∗(θ), r∗(θ), s∗(θ), and θ∗, by the variables
p∗(θ, α), q∗(θ, α), r∗(θ, α), s∗(θ, α), and θ∗(α), respectively.
We can now calculate the expected economic surplus, ESe(α) ≡ CW e(α)+PW e(α)
ESe(α) =
(3− 2α)a2
6(2− α)2 . (16)
Notice that ESe(α) attains its maximum value of a2/6 if α = 1, in which case ESe(α)
coincides with SW e(α). Let V denote this maximal surplus; i.e. V ≡ a2/6. Notice that
V is the expected value of the actual surplus ν(θ) ≡ (a − θ)2/2 under the regulator’s
belief f ; i.e., V = E[ν(θ)|f ].
Given V , we can write for any α the expected economic surplus as ESe(α) =
(3 − 2α)V/(2 − α)2. We can also define, for any value of α, the expected deadweight




We should notice that the distribution of expected welfare, (CW e(α), PW e(α)), as well
as the expected deadweight loss, DW e(α), varies with the parameter α. In particular,
we can observe that the triplet (CW e(α), PW e(α), DW e(α)) is equal to (V/2, V/4, V/4)
if α = 0, and equal to (0, V, 0) if α = 0. We can also check that PW e(α) is increasing
in α, whereas CW a(α) and DW e(α) are decreasing. If the regulator were to choose
α = 1 to minimize (eliminate) the deadweight loss, it would unintentionally minimize
the expected welfare of consumers, as well. On the other hand, if the regulator were to
choose α = 0 to maximize the expected welfare of consumers, it would unintentionally
maximize the expected deadweight loss. Thus, a benevolent regulator acting on behalf
of the society is confronted with a dilemma as to how to choose α in the most plau-
sible way from the viewpoint of consumers and the social efficiency. Borrowing from
Saglam (2021), we leave the solution of this dilemma to a regulatory bargaining pro-
cess, between consumers and the monopolist, which integrates the bargaining model
of Nash (1950) with a simplified version of BM’s (1982) regulatory model, which we
have described above. To define this bargaining process, we need some preliminaries.
2.1 Cooperative Bargaining
Consider a society of players N = {1, 2}, where 1 denotes consumers and 2 denotes
the monopolist-producer. Following Nash (1950), we define a two-player bargaining
problem for this society by a pair (S, d), where S ⊂ R2 denotes the bargaining set
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consisting of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility allocations, and d ∈ S denotes the
disagreement point specifying the utility each player must enjoy if they fail to agree on
any other point in S. The set S is assumed to be compact and convex, and it contains
a point s with s > d. Also, S is d-comprehensive; i.e., for all s, s′ ∈ R2, s ∈ S and
s ≥ s′ ≥ d only if s′ ∈ S. Let Σ2 denote the set of all two-person bargaining problems
that satisfy the assumptions above.
A bargaining rule F : Σ2 → R2 is a mapping such that F (S, d) ∈ S for any
(S, d) ∈ Σ2. Notice that F1(S, d) and F2(S, d) are the bargaining utilities of player 1
and player 2, respectively.
Below, we define some well-known bargaining rules. The Nash (1950) rule proposes
for any problem (S, d) ∈ Σ2 the solution
N(S, d) = argmaxx∈S (x1 − d1)(x2 − d2), (18)
at which the product of players’ net utility gains from agreement attains its maximum.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky rule, proposed by Raiffa (1953) for two-person games and
axiomatized by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), selects for any problem (S, d) ∈ Σ2 the
allocation














where for each i = 1, 2, ai(S, d) = max{si | s ∈ S and s−i = d−i} denotes the ideal util-
ity player i can expect from (S, d). Accordingly, the point a(S, d) = (a1(S, d), a2(S, d))
is called the ideal point for (S, d). The Kalai-Smorodinsky rule selects the maximum
point of S on the line segment connecting the points d and a(S, d).
A bargaining rule is called dictatorial for player i, or Dictatorial-i, and denoted by
Di if for each (S, d) ∈ Σ2
Di(S, d) = max{x ∈ S | xi ≥ di and xj = dj for j 6= i}. (20)
The rule Di chooses for player i the best point in the bargaining set, while providing
to the other player its disagreement utility.
A family of solutions, known as proportional solutions (Kalai, 1977), will be suf-
ficient for the analysis in this paper for reasons which will be explained later. Given
any γ ≥ 0, a bargaining rule is called γ-proportional, or simply P γ, if it selects for any
(S, d) ∈ Σ2 the allocation
P γ(S, d) = d+ Ω(S, d)(γ, 1) and Ω(S, d) = max{t | d+ t(γ, 1) ∈ S }. (21)
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We should notice that the rule P γ selects the maximum point of S on the line passing
through the point d and the point (γ, 1). In the definition of Kalai (1977), γ is positive.
We have included γ = 0 for convenience. (Notice that when γ = 0, the proportional
rule we have defined above coincides with a special rule that gives to player 2 full
dictatorial power.) When γ = 1, we obtain a well-known member of the γ-proportional
rules, known as the Egalitarian rule, which was first recommended by Rawls (1972).
For any bargaining problem, this rule chooses an allocation at which the worst-off
player’s net utility gain of from agreement is maximized. Also, note that for γ = 0
and γ = ∞, the rule P γ coincides with the dictatorial rules D2 and D1, respectively.
For any S ⊂ R2, we denote by WPO(S) = {x ∈ S | y > x implies y /∈ S } the set
of weakly Pareto optimal allocations in S and likewise we denote by PO(S) = {x ∈
S | y ≥ x implies y /∈ S } the set of Pareto optimal allocations in S. Below, we present
some axioms for an arbitrary solution F on Σ2.
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) If (S, d) ∈ Σ2, then F (S, d) ∈ WPO(S).
Pareto Optimality (PO) If (S, d) ∈ Σ2, then F (S, d) ∈ PO(S).
Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky rules satisfy Pareto Optimality (hence Weak Pareto
Optimality), whereas any γ-proportional satisfies Weak Pareto Optimality, but not
Pareto Optimality.
2.2 Pre-Donation
We modify Sertel’s (1992) definition of pre-donation for our model. A pre-donation
from player i to player j 6= i is a function λk,i : R2 → R2, parameterized by some
number k ∈ [0, 1), which transforms each s ∈ R2 into λk,i(s) such that λk,ii (s) =
(1 − k)si and λk,ij (s) = sj + ksi if j 6= i. Given any bargaining set S and any pre-
donation λk,i, we write
λk,i(S) = {λk,i(s) | s ∈ S } (22)
and for the comprehensive closure of λk,i(S) we write
λk,i(S) = {s′ ∈ R2+
∣
∣ s′i ≤ si and s′j ≤ sj if j 6= i, for some s ∈ λk,i(S)}. (23)
Notice that λk,i(S) is a convex and comprehensive bargaining set as in the model of
Nash (1950). Moreover if d ∈ S, then λk,i(d) ∈ λk,i(S). So, we will assume that
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the pre-donation λk,i(S) transforms the bargaining problem (S, d) into the problem
(λk,i(S),λk,i(d)).
Given any problem (S, d) ∈ Σ2, any bargaining rule F on Σ2, any k ∈ [0, 1), and
any i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that the pre-donation λk,i is
(i) beneficial for player m ∈ {1, 2} if Fm(λk,i(S),λk,i(d)) > Fm(S, d),
(ii) harmful for player m ∈ {1, 2} if Fm(λk,i(S),λk,i(d)) < Fm(S, d),
(iii) ineffective for player m ∈ {1, 2} if Fm(λk,i(S),λk,i(d)) = Fm(S, d).
2.3 Regulatory Bargaining under Pre-donation
Now we can turn to consider the specific bargaining problem in the regulated monop-
olistic industry. We assume that if the monopolist and consumers fail to agree in the
bargaining process, then the monopolist is not allowed to operate and consequently
both parties end up with zero utilities. Accordingly, we set the disagreement point to
dR = (0, 0), where the superscript R emphasizes that the bargaining payoffs are related
to the ‘regulatory’ mechanism of BM. Notice that as the parameter α is varied on the
interval [0, 1], equations (14) and (15) together define a locus of points in R2+. Defining
û1(α) ≡ CW e(α) and û2(α) ≡ PW e(α), we can write this locus as
û1(α) = 2
√
V û2(α)− 2û2(α). (24)
The convex and comprehensive hull of the above locus of points defines the bargaining



















0 ≤ u2(α) ≤
V











Notice that PO(SR) is the locus of points that satisfy (24). The pair (SR, dR) is the
(regulatory) bargaining problem in the absence of pre-donation. With pre-donation,
the problem (SR, dR) is transformed into a new problem which we will describe next.
First recall that we denote consumers and the producers by the indices 1 and
2, respectively. Thus, λk,1 (λk,2) denotes the pre-donation from consumers to the
producer (from the producer to consumers), realized at the rate k ∈ [0, 1). We should
observe that given any k ∈ [0, 1), the pre-donation λk,1 transforms the bargaining
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0 ≤ u2(α) ≤
[1 + 2k(1− α)]V











Likewise, given any k ∈ [0, 1), the pre-donation λk,2 transforms the bargaining problem
















0 ≤ u1(α) ≤
[2(1− α) + k]V
(2− α)2 ,
0 ≤ u2(α) ≤
(1− k)V











In Figure 1, we illustrate the effect of pre-donation on a bargaining problem.


























(ii) Player 2 (Producer) Pre-donates
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2.4 The Modified BM Mechanism
We will modify the regulatory mechanism of BM by allowing consumers and the mo-
nopolist to collectively choose the expected social welfare function that will be maxi-
mized by the regulator over the direct-revelation mechanisms proposed by BM. Con-
sumers and the monopolist will solve this choice problem using a cooperative bargaining
game under pre-donation (utility transfers from the pre-donating side to the receiver).
We will consider this bargaining game separately under two informational situations,
namely the ex-ante stage and the interim stage. The interim stage reflects the assumed
informational state in the BM model where the producer privately knows its marginal
cost parameter (which is unknown to consumers and the regulator until the end of
the implementation of the regulatory mechanism). What we introduce in this study is
an ex-ante stage where even the producer does not know about its marginal cost pa-
rameter, yet. Associated with the two informational stages, our model, and hence our
modified regulatory mechanism, will have two variants, in one of which pre-donations
occur in the ex-ante stage and in the other pre-donations occur in the interim stage.
However, we will retain one important feature of the BM model assuming that infor-
mation revelation will always occur in the interim stage. We will also assume that
the regulator will inform both the monopolist and consumers about the details of the
modified regulatory mechanism at the beginning of the stage they are allowed to make
pre-donation. Given these assumptions, if consumers should decide whether and how
much to pre-donate in the ex-ante or interim stage, they should always consider the
maximization of their ex-ante payoffs. In contrast, the producer should take into ac-
count its ex-ante payoff only if it makes pre-donation decision in the ex-ante stage.
When it is allowed to pre-donate in the interim stage, the producer should always
consider the maximization of its interim (equivalently ex-post) payoff.
After these observations, we are ready to describe the modified BM mechanism
under pre-donation.
The Modified BM Mechanism
Step 1: The regulator picks, and announces, from the interval [0, 1] a
value, α, to be used for the initial value of the social welfare weight of the
producer.
Step 2: Given the announced α value, all parties (the regulator, the
producer, and consumers) calculate the induced expected utility allocation
W (α) = (CW e(α), PW e(α)) implied by the BM mechanism. They also
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calculate the problem (SR, dR) and select a proportional rule P γ with γ ≥ 0
such that P γ(SR, dR) = W (α).
Step 3: The regulator announces the index of the player, say i, which
is allowed to make a unilateral pre-donation.
Step 4: The regulator announces a function α̃ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] such
that if player i were to announce pre-donation parameter, as any k′ ∈ [0, 1),
the regulator would run the BM mechanism with α̃(α, k′), instead of α, to
ensure that (1−k)Wi(α̃(α, k′)) = P γi (λk
′,i(SR), dR). (Due to the geometries
of the bargaining sets SR and λk
′,i(SR) and the fact that W (α) ∈ PO(SR),
we know that α̃(α, k′) exists for all k′ ∈ [0, 1).)
Step 5: Given the announced function α̃(α, .), player i picks, and an-
nounces, from the interval [0, 1) a value, k, to be used for its pre-donation
rate in all relevant calculations.
Step 6: Given the announced k value, all parties calculate the pre-
donation function λk,i, the social welfare weight α̃(α, k), the bargaining set
λk,i(SR), and the disagreement point λk,i(dR) = dR. They also calculate
the induced bargaining solution P γ(λk,i(SR), dR). This is the expected
utility allocation of the modified BM mechanism and denoted by W̃ i(α, k).
Recall that for any α chosen by the regulator, the BM mechanism consists of the
list of functions 〈(p∗(., α), q∗(., α), r∗(., α), s∗(., α)〉. We will denote this mechanism by
Γ(α). We can then denote the modified BM mechanism we have described above by
Γ̃i(α, k) which is equal to Γ(α̃(α, k)) ∪ {λk,i, P γ, α̃}. Notice that the BM mechanism,
Γ(α) generates the welfare allocation W (α) whereas the modified BM mechanism by
Γ̃i(α, k) generates W̃ i(α, k).
Now we turn to consider the problem of the producer in the above bargaining game.
Notice that the modified BM mechanism Γ̃i(α, k) operates through the BM mechanism
Γ(α̃(α, k)) to extract the private information of the producer. Thus, it satisfies ex-
post incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions. Consequently, the
producer will obtain in the ex-post stage, after the revelation of its private information
is realized, the actual profit π(θ, α̃(α, k)). In the interim stage, the producer can
precisely calculate this profit since it completely knows the actual value of θ. In fact,
it can calculate the actual gross utility π(θ, α̃(α, k)) it would get under any pre-donation
rate k ∈ [0, 1). When pre-donation occurs, the actual net utility of the producer would
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be
πa(θ, α, k) = π(θ, α̃(α, k))− kW2(α̃(α, k)). (28)
When the producer is allowed to make pre-donation in the interim stage, it must choose
k, in the interval [0, 1), to maximize this actual net utility.
In the ex-ante stage, the objective of the producer is inevitably different. Since the
producer does not (yet) know in this stage what the actual value of θ is, it cannot
calculate its actual net utility resulting from any pre-donation. We assume that in the
ex-ante stage the producer has the same (incomplete) information about θ as do the
regulator and consumers. Thus, it shares their beliefs f(.) about the distribution of θ.
Because the producer can calculate πa(θ, α, k) for all possible values of θ ∈ (0, a] and
k ∈ [0, 1), it can calculate its expected value under the beliefs f(.). Notice that the
expected value of π(θ, α̃(α, k)) is just equal to W2(α̃). Accordingly, the expected net
utility of the producer from the bargaining game becomes
E[πa(θ, α, k)|f ] = (1− k)W2(α̃(α, k)), (29)
for any k ∈ [0, 1). So, if the producer is allowed to make pre-donation only in the
ex-ante stage, it should maximize the above expected net utility over possible values
of k in [0, 1).
On the other hand, consumers who can learn about θ only after the cost-revelation
occurs in the interim stage, always consider the maximization of their expected utility
whenever they are allowed to pre-donate in the ex-ante or interim stage. This expected
utility simply becomes (1 − k)W1(α̃(α, k)) if consumers choose the pre-donation rate
as k ∈ [0, 1).
3 Results
In this section, our goal is to explore whether there exist any α ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ {1, 2}
such that the modified BM mechanism Γ̃i(α, k) can Pareto dominate, in the ex-ante or
interim stage, the BM mechanism Γ(α). To achieve this goal, we will first restrict our
attention to the bargaining problems with and without pre-donation and explore the
effect of pre-donation by consumers or the producer on the solutions implied by some
bargaining rules that are relevant for our purpose.
Notice that the regulatory outcome that is determined by the BM mechanism is
always ex-ante Pareto optimal. Since the bargaining solution in the absence of pre-
donation must be equivalent to the expected utility allocation generated by the BM
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mechanism, we will restrict our attention to bargaining rules that respect Weak Pareto
Optimality and has the potential to select a Pareto Optimal solution for the problem
(SR, dR). On this account, we can restrict ourselves to the class of proportional rules
with no loss of generality. To see why that is so, consider any problem (S, d) ∈ Σ2
and any bargaining rule F on Σ2 that satisfies Weak Pareto Optimality. Define γ ≡
F1(S, d)/F2(S, d). By the definition of the rule P
γ, we have P γ(S, d) ∈ WPO(S). Also,
P γ1 (S, d)/P
γ
2 (S, d) = F1(S, d)/F2(S, d). Moreover, F (S, d) ∈ WPO(S) since F satisfies
Weak Pareto Optimality. Therefore, we must have P γ(S, d) = F (S, d). So, in order
to study the implications of bargaining rules that satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality in
any fixed bargaining problem, it is sufficient to consider only the set of proportional
bargaining rules.
Before moving to our results, we will borrow, as a preliminary, two helpful results
from Saglam (2021).
Proposition 1. (Saglam, 2021) Given the bargaining problem (SR, dR), the bar-
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V if γ > 2.
(30)
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 10 in Saglam (2021). 
The above result leads to the following simple corollary.
Corollary 1. (Saglam, 2021) Given the bargaining problem (SR, dR), the bargain-
ing rule P γ and the BM mechanism lead to the same utility allocation if and only if
γ = 2(1− α).
The proof of the above corollary, which was stated as Corollary 7 in Saglam (2021),
rests on the observation that the utility ratio u1/u2 is equal to γ under the bargaining
rule P γ while it is equal to 2(1 − α) under the BM mechanism, as can be observed
from equations (14) and (15).
Now we turn to consider the problem of pre-donation. The following lemma shows
that a positive amount of pre-donation from consumers to the producer, λk,1 with
k ∈ (0, 1], contracts the bargaining set SR so that WPO(λk,1(SR)) is always below
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WPO(SR) except for the point (V, 0) where the two frontiers intersect.
Lemma 1. For any k ∈ (0, 1] and u ∈ WPO(SR) it is true that λk,1(u) = u if u1 = 0
and λk,1(u) ∈ SR \WPO(SR) if u1 > 0.
Proof. Pick any k ∈ (0, 1) and u ∈ WPO(SR). If u1 = 0 then λk,1(u) = u, by
(26). So, let u1 > 0. Again by (26), we know that λ
k,1(u) is on the (half-open)
line segment [b, u[ where b ≡ (0, u1 + u2). Consider the line segment [d, u[ where
d ≡ (0, V ). In order to prove λk,1(u) ∈ SR \WPO(SR), it is sufficient to show that b
is below d implying u1 + u2 < V . By (25), there exists a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that
u1 = 2(1− α)V/(2− α)2. Since u1 > 0, we know that α 6= 1; thus u2 < V . Moreover,
u2 = V/(2− α)2 if u ∈ PO(SR), and u2 ∈ [0, V/(2− α)2) if u ∈ WPO(SR) \ PO(SR)
(which occurs when α = 0). Therefore, for any u ∈ WPO(SR) with u1 > 0, we have
u1 + u2 ≤ (3− 2α)V/(2− α)2, and we know that the right-hand-side of this inequality
is less than V for all α ∈ [0, 1). 
Lemma 2. Given any bargaining rule P γ with γ > 0, the pre-donation from con-
sumers to the producer via λk,1 with any k ∈ (0, 1] is harmful in terms of expected
utilities for both consumers and the producer.
Proof. Pick any γ > 0 and consider the bargaining rule P γ. Let u = P γ(SR, dR)
and u′ = P γ(λk,1(SR), dR). By (21), u and u′ are on the line connecting dR and the
point (γ, 1), and also u ∈ WPO(SR) and u′ ∈ WPO(λk,1(SR)). By Lemma 1, the set
WPO(λk,1(SR)) is always below WPO(SR) except for the point (V, 0) where the two
sets intersect. Moreover, {u, u′} ∩ {(V, 0)} = ∅ since γ > 0. Therefore, we must have
u′1 < u1 and u
′
2 < u2. 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the welfare effect predicted by Lemma 2. This result
implies that if consumers make pre-donation the modified BM mechanism becomes al-
ways inferior, in terms of expected utilities, to the BM mechanism for both consumers
and the producer.
Proposition 2. For any α ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ (0, 1], the modified BM mechanism Γ̃1(α, k)
under the pre-donation λk,1 is always ex-ante Pareto inferior to the BM mechanism
Γ(α).
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Proof. Pick any α ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ (0, 1]. Let γ = 2(1 − α). By Corollary 1, the
BM mechanism yields the expected utility allocation W (α) = P γ(SR, dR). We also
know that the modified BM mechanism Γ̃1(α, k) yields the expected utility allocation
W 1(α, k) = P γ(λk,1(SR), dR). Moreover, Lemma 2 implies that P γi (λ
k,1(SR), dR) <
P γi (S
R, dR) for each i = 1, 2. So, Γ̃1(α, k) is ex-ante Pareto inferior to Γ(α). 
Since the modified BM mechanism Γ̃1(α, k) and the BM mechanism Γ(α) coincide
only if k = 0, Proposition 2 implies that consumers would choose not to pre-donate
under the modified BM mechanism. It also implies that any improvement by the mod-
ified mechanism Γ̃i(α, k) should not be expected unless i = 2, i.e., the pre-donating
party in the bargaining process is the producer. The following lemma shows that the
pre-donation from the producer to consumers, λk,2 for any k ∈ (0, 1], twists the bar-
gaining set SR around a point u in WPO(SR) with u2 = V (1− k).
Lemma 3. For any k ∈ (0, 1] it is true that
(i) if u ∈ SR is such that u2 > (1− k)V , then u /∈ λk,2(SR),
(ii) if u ∈ SR is such that u2 ≤ (1 − k)V , then there exists u′ ∈ λk,2(SR) such that
u′1 > u1 and u
′
2 = u2.
Proof. Consider any k ∈ (0, 1].
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(i). Pick any u ∈ λk,2(SR). By (26), there exists u′ ∈ SR such that u = λk,2(u′).
Notice that u′2 ≤ V , implying (1 − k)u′2 ≤ (1 − k)V . Since u2 = (1 − k)u′2, we have
u2 ≤ (1− k)V , completing the proof of part (i).
(ii). Now pick any u ∈ SR such that u2 ≤ (1−k)V . First assume that u /∈ WPO(SR).
Pick any u′ ∈ SR such that u′1 > u1 and u′2 = u2. Let u′′2 = u′1/(1 − k) and
u′′1 = u
′
1 − ku′′2. Clearly, u′′ ∈ SR and u′ = λk,2(u′′). Thus, u′ ∈ λk,2(SR). Now,
assume that u ∈ WPO(SR) \ PO(SR). By (26), u1 = V/2 and u2 ∈ [0, V/4). Let
û ∈ SR be such that û1 = u1 and û2 = u2/(1 − k). Also, let u′ ∈ R2+ be such that
u′1 = û1+kû2 and u
′
2 = (1−k)û2. Notice that u′ = λk,2(û), hence u′ ∈ λk,2(SR). Also,
u′1 > u1 and u
′
2 = u2. Finally, assume that u ∈ PO(SR). Recall that u2 ≤ (1− k)V by
assumption. To prove that there exists u′ ∈ λk,2(SR) such that u′1 > u1 and u′2 = u2,
it is sufficient to show that for any x ∈ PO(SR) the line segment (x,λk,2(x)] is out-
side SR. This can be true if the slope of [x,λk,2(x)] (in absolute value), which is 1,
is smaller than the slope of PO(SR) (in absolute value) at any y ∈ Y where Y is a
subset of PO(SR) satisfying max{y2 | y ∈ Y } = x2 and min{y2 | y ∈ Y } = λk,2(x).
For any y ∈ PO(SR), we know by (24) and (25) that y1 = 2
√
V y2 − 2y2. Thus,
we have |dy2/dy1| = |
√
V/y2 − 2|−1. We also know that y2 ∈ [V/4, V ]. Therefore,
|dy2/dy1| ∈ (1,∞) for any y ∈ Y , implying that the line segment (x,λk,2(x)] is outside
SR, which completes the proof. 
Lemma 4. Given any bargaining rule P γ with γ > 0, the pre-donation from the
producer to consumers via λk,2 is
(i) ex-ante beneficial for the producer and consumers if k < k̄(γ),
(ii) ex-ante harmful for the producer and consumers if k > k̄(γ),












if γ ∈ (0, 2]
1− 1
2γ
if γ > 2.
(31)
Proof. Pick any γ > 0 and consider the bargaining rule P γ. Let u(γ) ≡ P γ(SR)
and u′(γ) ≡ P γ(λk,2(SR)). If γ ∈ (0, 2], then equations (21), (24), and (25) would
imply that u1(γ) = 2(1−α∗)/(2−α∗)2 and u2(γ) = 1/(2−α∗)2 for some α∗ such that
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u1(γ)/u2(γ) = γ = 2(1−α∗). It follows that α∗ = 1−γ/2, implying u2(γ) = 4V/(2+γ)2.
On the other hand, if γ > 2, then u2(γ) = V/(2γ). Now, define k̄(γ) ≡ 1 − u2(γ)/V
for each γ > 0. Notice that u(γ) and u′(γ) are on the same line passing through
the points dR = (0, 0) and (γ, 1) and they are the maximal points of WPO(SR) and
WPO(λk,2(SR)) on this line. Also, since this line is positively sloped, any pre-donation
by the producer makes both of the bargaining parties better off if it makes any of them
better off. Thus, we observe from (27) and Lemma 3 that λk,2 is (i) ex-ante beneficial
for all parties, i.e., u′i(γ) > ui(γ) for each i = 1, 2, if u2(γ) < (1− k)V or k < k̄(γ), (ii)
ex-ante harmful for all parties, i.e., u′i(γ) < ui(γ) for each i = 1, 2, if u2(γ) > (1− k)V
or k > k̄(γ), and (iii) ex-ante ineffective for all parties, i.e., u′i(γ) = ui(γ) for each
i = 1, 2, if u2(γ) = (1− k)V or k = k̄(γ). 
The welfare effect in Lemma 4 is illustrated in Figure 3. Recall that when α = 1,
the BM mechanism produces the utility allocation W (1) = (0, V ), under which player
2 (the producer) has no incentive to pre-donate. On the other hand, when α < 1, there
is always an expected deadweight loss generated by the BM mechanism, as calculated
in equation (17). Below, we will explore whether this loss can be reduced by the mod-
ification of the BM mechanism under the producer’s pre-donation, even when it is not
optimal.
Proposition 3. For any α ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ (0, 1], the modified BM mechanism
Γ̃2(α, k) under the pre-donation λk,2 is
(i) ex-ante Pareto superior to the BM mechanism Γ(α) if k < k̄(α),
(ii) ex-ante Pareto inferior to the BM mechanism Γ(α) if k > k̄(α),
(iii) ex-ante Pareto equivalent to the BM mechanism Γ(α) if k = k̄(α),
where k̄(α) = 1− 1/(2− α)2.
Proof. Pick any α ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ (0, 1]. Let γ = 2(1 − α). Notice that γ ∈ [0, 2].
By Corollary 1, W (α) = P γ(SR, dR). We also know that the modified BM mechanism
Γ̃1(α, k) yields the expected utility allocation W 2(α, k) = P γ(λk,2(SR), dR). Notice
that the threshold in equation (31) reduces to k̄(γ) = 1 − 4/(2 + γ)2 since γ ∈ [0, 2].
Notice also that the equality γ = 2(1 − α) implies that k ≥ k̄(γ) if and only if k ≥
k̄(α) = 1−1/(2−α)2. Thus, Lemma 4 implies that (i) P γi (λk,2(SR), dR) > P γi (SR), dR)
for each i = 1, 2 and Γ̃2(α, k) is ex-ante Pareto superior to Γ(α) if k < k̄(α), (ii)
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P γi (λ
k,2(SR), dR) < P γi (S
R), dR) for each i = 1, 2 and Γ̃2(α, k) is ex-ante Pareto infe-
rior to Γ(α) if k > k̄(α), (iii) P γi (λ
k,2(SR), dR) = P γi (S
R), dR) for each i = 1, 2 and
Γ̃2(α, k) is ex-ante Pareto equivalent to Γ(α) if k > k̄(α). 
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γ(SR, dR)=P γ(λk,2(SR), dR)
Slope = 1/γ
•
(iii) k = k̄(γ)
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Notice that the modified BM mechanism Γ̃2(α, k) becomes ex-ante inferior to the
BM mechanism for the producer (and consumers) when the pre-donation fraction k
exceeds the threshold k̄(α) for any given α ∈ [0, 1], Thus, we should never expect
an equilibrium where the producer pre-donates more than the amount implied by this
threshold. Given this observation, our next question is to find the optimal pre-donation
by the producer in the ex-ante stage where it has not learned the actual value of θ, yet.
Here, we assume that the producer will always prefer no pre-donation to an ineffective
pre-donation, which arises if k = k̄(α), because of the actual implementation costs of
pre-donation we have assumed to be zero for simplicity. This leaves us with part (i) of
Proposition 3 suggesting that the producer should restrict itself to pre-donation func-
tions whose parameter, k, lies in the set [0, 1 − 1/(2 − α)2). In this set, the producer
should choose the value of k to maximize its bargaining utility P γ2 (λ
k,2(SR), dR), which
is equal to (1− k)W2(α̃(α, k)) by equation (29).
Lemma 5. Given any bargaining rule P γ with γ > 0, the ex-ante optimal pre-donation
from the producer to consumers is a function λk
∗,2 where k∗ = γ/(1 + γ). This yields
to consumers and the firm the bargaining utilities P γ1 (λ
k∗,2(SR), dR) = γV/(1+γ) and
P γ2 (λ
k∗,2(SR), dR) = V/(1 + γ), respectively.
Proof. Pick any γ > 0 and consider the rule P γ. Let u(γ, k) ≡ P γ(λk,2(SR), dR)
for any k ∈ [0, 1). The problem of the producer is to find the value of k that
maximizes u2(γ, k). Notice that u(γ, k) is the point of intersection between the set
WPO(λk,2(SR)) and the line passing through the points dR and (γ, 1). Notice also
that the line segment [(0, V ), (V, 0)] is the upper envelope of the sets WPO(λk,2(SR))
obtained when k is varied over [0, 1]. Therefore, k = k∗ maximizes u2(γ, k) only if
u(γ, k∗) is on the line segment [(0, V ), (V, 0)] or equivalently u1(γ, k
∗) + u2(γ, k
∗) = V .
Then, using the fact that u1(γ, k
∗)/u2(γ, k
∗) = γ by the definition of P γ, we obtain
u2(γ, k
∗) = V/(1 + γ) and u1(γ, k
∗) = γV/(1 + γ), implying k∗ = γ/(1 + γ). One can
easily check that k∗ < k̄(γ) for all γ > 0. Thus, the pre-donation implied by k∗ is
optimal for the producer. 
Figure 4 portrays how to find the optimal pre-donation k∗ by the producer. Below,
we calculate the value of k∗ under some well-known bargaining rules to give an insight
how widely it can vary in its range when γ changes.
Remark 1. Given the bargaining rule P γ, the ex-ante optimal pre-donation from
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the producer to consumers via λk
∗,2 implies (i) k∗ = 2/3 if P γ is outcome equivalent
to the Dictatorial-1 rule, (ii) k∗ = 1/2 if P γ is outcome equivalent to the Egalitarian
rule, (iii) k∗ = 2/5 if P γ is outcome equivalent to the Nash rule, (iv) k∗ = 1/3 if P γ
is outcome equivalent to the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule, and (v) k∗ = 0 if P γ is outcome
equivalent to the Dictatorial-2 rule.
Proof. We know that the rule P γ is outcome equivalent to the Egalitarian rule only if
γ = 1. Also, we know from Corollary 6 of Saglam (2021) that P γ is outcome equivalent
to the Nash rule only if γ = 2/3 and to the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule only if γ = 1/2.
Moreover, for γ = 2 and γ = 0, P γ becomes outcome equivalent to the Dictatorial-1
and Dictatorial-2 rules, respectively. Inserting each of these five values of γ into the
equation k∗ = γ/(1 + γ) yields the desired result. 
Figure 4. Bargaining under the Rule P γ and the Optimal Pre-donation λk
∗,2
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Recall that for any α ∈ [0, 1], the expected utility allocation produced by the BM
mechanism is always Pareto optimal, i.e., W (α) ∈ PO(SR). Moreover, Corollary 1
reveals that W (α) = P γ(SR, dR) if and only if γ = 2(1−α). This implies that any pro-
portional bargaining rule P γ selects its solution from PO(SR) if and only if γ ∈ [0, 2]. It
follows that for any proportional rule that selects its solution from PO(SR) the optimal
pre-donation by the producer must fall in the interval [0/(1 + 0), 2/(1 + 2)] = [0, 2/3].
Remark 1 above shows that the lower and upper bounds of this interval are induced
by the Dictatorial-2 and Dictatorial-1 rules respectively, while the Egalitarian, Nash,
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and Kalai-Smorodisnky rules are compatible with k∗ values in the interior of the same
interval.
Proposition 4. For any α ∈ [0, 1], the modified BM mechanism Γ̃1(α, k∗) under
the ex-ante optimal pre-donation λk
∗,2 yields the expected utility allocation W 2(α, k∗)
where W 21 (α, k
∗) = 2(1− α)V/(3− 2α) and W 22 (α, k∗) = V/(3− 2α).
Proof. Pick any α ∈ [0, 1]. Let γ = 2(1− α). We know that the modified BM mech-
anism Γ̃1(α, k∗) yields the expected utility allocation W 2(α, k∗) = P γ(λk
∗,2(SR), dR).
Also, by Lemma 5, P γ1 (λ
k∗,2(SR), dR) = γV/(1+γ) and P γ2 (λ
k∗,2(SR), dR) = V/(1+γ).
Replacing γ in the last two equations with 2(1− α), we obtain the desired result. 
The optimal pre-donation of the producer induced by k∗ always equates the ratio
between the utilities of consumers and the producer to the slope γ under any rule P γ
as can be seen from Lemma 5. Since the BM mechanism Γ(α) induced by any α ∈ [0, 1]
is outcome equivalent to a bargaining rule P γ only if γ = 2(1−α), we observe that the
modified BM mechanism Γ̃2(α, k∗) induced by α and k∗ equates the ratio between the
utilities of consumers and the producer to 2(1− α) as does the BM mechanism. This
implies that the same ratio must exist between the utility gains of the two parties gen-
erated by the modified BM mechanism with respect to the status quo. The following
result shows that these utility gains are always decreasing in α.
Corollary 2. For any α ∈ [0, 1], the expected utility gain of the modified BM mecha-








Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, 2} the gain ∆Γ̃2i (α) is always decreasing in α.
Proof. The equations for the utility gains follow from equations (15), (14), and
Proposition 4. Differentiating them with respect to α we can straightforwardly reach
the desired result. 
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The result that the utility gains implied by the modified BM mechanism under the
optimal pre-donation of the producer are positive as long as α < 1 is not surprising
since by Proposition 3-(i) we already know that given any k ∈ [0, 1) and a pre-donation
λk,2, the induced modified BM mechanism is Pareto superior to the BM mechanism if
k is below the threshold k̄(α) while by Lemma 5 and Proposition 4 we know that the
optimal pre-donation by the producer satisfies this threshold condition for all α ∈ (0, 1].
The result that the aforementioned utility gains are decreasing in α is not surprising
either, since the expected deadweight loss in the BM mechanism is decreasing in α, as
we can recall from (17). Thus, the social benefit of the modified mechanism, though
it is always positive for any α less than 1, becomes lower and lower, and eventually
totally diminished, as α approaches 1 from below.
Table 1. The Utilities Generated by Various Bargaining Rules under the








































































































Dictatorial-2 1 0 0 (0, V ) (0, V )
In Table 1, we report the calculated utilities without pre-donation and with an op-
timal pre-donation under five distinct bargaining rules, including Dictatorial-1, Egal-
itarian, Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Dictatorial-2 rules. We should observe that
under all five rules, the producer’s optimal pre-donation, whenever positive, increases
the utility of consumers as well. The percentage increase in the bargaining utilities
of consumers and the producer due to the optimal pre-donation by the producer can
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be calculated as (16.67, 8.33), (5.56, 5.56), (2.50, 3.75), (1.33, 2.67), and (0, 0) for the
Dictatorial-1, Egalitarian, Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Dictatorial-2 rules, respec-
tively. It is interesting to see from Table 1 that under the optimal pre-donation λk
∗,2,
the solution under the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule can be obtained from the solution under
the Dictatorial-1 distribution by permuting the expected utilities of the producer and
consumers. That is to say, when consumers are given the dictatorial power in the reg-
ulatory bargaining, they could obtain under the optimal pre-donation λk
∗,2 only what
the producer would get under the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule, instead of the diametrically
opposed Dictatorial-2 rule under which the producer is entitled to the whole surplus V .
This result is simply caused by the asymmetry (skewness) in the bargaining problem
SR, which remains to manifest itself in the bargaining problem λk
∗,2(SR).
So far, we have implicitly assumed that when the bargaining party i makes any pre-
donation within the rules of the modified BM mechanism Γ̃i(α, k), its opponent j does
not reject or reverse it. Now, we shall see the implications of relaxing this assumption.
We have seen the under the mechanism Γ̃1(α, k), the pre-donating party, consumers,
have never incentive to choose the rate of pre-donation k above zero, therefore the
implicit assumption that the producer never rejects pre-donation has practically no
bite. On the other hand, the producer has clearly an incentive to make a reverse pre-
donation under Γ̃1(α, k). Whereas consumers would choose their pre-donation rate as
k1 = 0, the producer would optimally respond in turn by choosing its unasked, and
formally unallowed, pre-donation rate as k2 = k
∗ = γ/(1 + γ) = 2(1− α)/(3− 2α), as
implied by Lemma 5. Thus, by informally or illegally, yet optimally, deviating from
the modified mechanism Γ̃1(α, k), the producer has always incentive to implement the
outcome of the mechanism Γ̃2(α, k∗). Proposition 3 and the proof of Lemma 5 together
imply that consumers always become better-off when the producer pre-donates at a rate
k2 = k
∗ formally under the mechanism Γ̃2(α, k2), or informally under the mechanism
Γ̃1(α, k1) after consumers optimally choose k1 = 0. Thus, a benevolent regulator
can be argued to serve the interests of the society by allowing the producer to make
reverse pre-donation under the mechanism Γ̃1(α, .). However, still a question remains
as to whether consumers could not also improve their welfare by rejecting or reversing
some part of the producer’s formal pre-donation under the mechanism Γ̃2(α, .), or
equivalently some part of the producer’s informal pre-donation under the mechanism
Γ̃1(α, .).
To answer the above question, notice that for any k1 ∈ [0, 1) a reverse pre-donation
λk1,1 made by consumers under the mechanism Γ̃2(α, k2) when the producer make its
pre-donation formally according to λk2,2 for any k2 ∈ [0, 1) would change the bargain-
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ing problem from λk2,2(SR) to λk1,1(λk2,2(SR)), whereas it would have no effect on
the disagreement point since λk1,1(λk2,2(dR)) = dR.
Lemma 6. For any α ∈ [0, 1], k2 ∈ [0, 1), and the associated mechanism Γ̃2(α, k2),











if k2 > k
∗.
(32)
Proof. Pick any α ∈ [0, 1], k2 ∈ [0, 1), and consider the associated mechanism
Γ̃2(α, k2). First observe that when k2 is equal to k
∗, the optimal rate chosen by the
producer in the ex-ante stage, consumers’ expected welfare also reaches its maximal
level that any value of k2 lead to, since the equilibrium utility allocation (k
∗V, (1−k∗)V )
implied by the mechanism Γ̃2(α, k∗) is on the Pareto frontier of the transformed bar-
gaining set λk
∗,2(SR). Also note that if u ∈ λk2,2(SR) and u′ ∈ λk1,1(λk2,2(SR)) such
that u2 = u
′
2 6= V , then u′1 < u1. That is to say, reverse pre-donation of consumers al-
ways contracts the transformed bargaining set λk2,2(SR) for any k2 ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
it is not optimal for consumers to contract this set even further if k2 ≤ k∗, implying
that their optimal response must be k1 = 0.
On the other hand, if k2 > k
∗, then the mechanism Γ̃2(α, k2) chooses on the bar-
gaining set λk2,2(SR) the allocation û such that û ∈ WPO(λk2,2(SR))\PO(λk2,2(SR))
with û2 = (1 − k2)V and û1 = γ(1 − k2)V . Since γ(1 − k2)V < γ(1 − k∗)V = k∗V ,
we have û1 < k
∗V ; i.e., consumers are worse off under Γ̃2(α, k2) than they would be
under Γ̃2(α, k∗). So, consumers have an incentive to contract λk2,2(SR). Notice that
consumers always get γ times what the producer obtains under the rule P γ. Therefore,
for consumers the optimal choice of k1 ∈ (0, 1) must ensure that γ times what the pro-
ducer obtains under the reverse pre-donation λk1,1 is equal to k∗V , the highest utility
that consumers can obtain under P γ. So, we must have γ[k1(k2V )+ (1−k2)V ] = k∗V .
Inserting above γ = k∗/(1−k∗) and rearranging the equation yields k1 = 1−(k∗/k2). 
Proposition 5. Consumers have no incentive to reverse the optimal pre-donation of
the producer k∗ under the modified BM mechanism Γ̃2.
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma 6. 
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Up until now, we have dealt with the possibility of pre-donation in the ex-ante stage.
We shall henceforth consider the interim stage. Notice that consumers’ information
about the producer’s private cost parameter θ is the same in the ex-ante and interim
stages. Therefore, consumers make expected utility calculations in the interim stage,
as well. Since Lemma 2 implies that the pre-donation from consumers to the producer
is always harmful for consumers in the ex-ante stage, it must remain to be so in the
interim stage, as well. As for the producer, however, this is not true. We know from
Proposition 4 that the sum of the total utility under the modified BM mechanism
Γ2(α, k∗) is always equal to V . Therefore, the modified welfare weight is always equal
to α̃(α, k∗) = 1. That is, the regulator always gives under the modified BM mechanism
Γ2(α, k∗) the whole expected surplus V to the producer, and out of this the producer
pre-donates k∗V to consumers. In result, the actual net profit of the producer that














(In Section 2, we saw that the upper bound of the integral in the above equation is
θ∗(α̃(α, k∗)) = a/(2−α̃(α, k∗)) and the optimal output function is q∗(x, α̃(α, k∗)) = a−
(2−α̃(α, k∗))x for any x ∈ (0, a] which reduce to θ∗(α̃(α, k∗)) = a and q∗(x, (α̃(α, k∗))) =
a− x since α̃(α, k∗) = 1.)
One can easily show that the expected value of π̃(θ, α) is just equal to W̃ 22 (1, k
∗),
i.e., what the producer expects to earn from the modified BM mechanism Γ̃2(1, k∗)
in the ex-ante stage. However, in the interim stage the expected value of π̃(θ, α) is
nothing but itself for the producer, as it has learned the true value of θ. Thus, in the
interim stage the producer must only be interested in maximizing its actual profit,
and this profit does not have to be equal to the actual profit π̃(θ, α) it would obtain in
the ex-ante stage. Since the optimal pre-donation rate of the producer in the ex-ante
stage is independent of θ (as shown by Lemma 5), the actual profit it would induce
runs the risk of becoming negative if θ is sufficiently close to a, or more formally if
θ > θ(α) = a[1−
√
2(1− α)/(3(3− 2α))], as can be observed from (33). When α = 0,
this condition reduces to θ > θ(0) = a[1−
√
2/3] ∼ 0.53 a, which becomes never binding
since we also know that the firm is allowed to operate only if θ ≤ θ∗(α) = a/(2−α) and
this second condition reduces to θ ≤ 0.50 a when α = 0. When α = 1, pre-donation
is not observed (k∗ = 0). In this limiting case, the threshold θ(α) reduces to a, im-
plying that the actual profit of the firm is always non-negative. On the other hand, if
α ∈ (0.157, 1), then θ(α) < θ∗(α) < 1 implying that π̃(θ, α) < 0 for all θ ∈ [θ(α), θ∗(α)].
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That is, for most values of α, there exists a non-zero measure of θ values where the
producer will find that the optimal pre-donation it would make in the ex-ante stage
can no longer be optimal in the interim stage.
Remark 2. For any α ∈ [0, 1) and θ ∈ [0, a), the producer finds that the outcome of
the modified BM mechanism Γ̃2(α, k∗) with the ex-ante optimal pre-donation λk
∗,2 is
(i) interim superior to the BM mechanism Γ(α) if θ < θ̄(α),
(ii) interim inferior to Γ(α) if θ > θ̄(α), and
(iii) interim equivalent to Γ(α) if θ = θ̄(α),
where θ̄(α) = a[1−
√
2(1− α)/(3(3− 2α))].
The observations in the above remark directly imply the following.
Proposition 6. For any α ∈ [0, 1), the modified BM mechanism Γ̃2(α, k∗) under
the ex-ante optimal pre-donation λk
∗,2 is interim Pareto non-comparable to the BM
mechanism Γ(α).
Our next question is to find the interim optimal pre-donation for the producer
under the modified BM mechanism. Notice that Remark 2-(i) only shows that the
producer interim prefers the ex-ante optimal pre-donation λk
∗,2 to no pre-donation
λ0,2; it does not imply that λk
∗,2 is interim optimal. As we have already discussed in
Section 2.4, the objective of the producer when it chooses the pre-donation rate in the
interim stage is to maximize the actual net profit πa(θ, α, k) given by equation (28).
For any choice of pre-donation rate k ∈ [0, 1), the modified BM mechanism will be
Γ̃2(α, k). The regulator, to whom θ is yet unknown, will determine the function α̃(., .)
to satisfy
(1− k)W2(α̃(α, k)) = P γ2 ((λk,2(SR), dR)) (34)
at each k ∈ [0, 1) using the conversion γ = 2(1 − α). From the viewpoint of the
regulator and consumers, the expected value of the gross profit from the modified BM
mechanism, π(θ, α̃(α, k)), is still equal to W2(α̃(α, k)) and the expected value of the
actual net profits, πa(θ, α, k), is therefore still P γ2 ((λ
k,2(SR), dR)) as in the ex-ante
stage.
The producer, on the other hand, can fully observe πa(θ, α, k) for any choice of k.
However, the producer has now an additional constraint in the interim stage. Recall
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that in the ex-ante stage, the interests of the producer and consumers were aligned as
shown by Lemma 4. A pre-donation by the producer is ex-ante beneficial (harmful)
for itself if and only if it is also so for consumers. In the interim stage, this alignment
does not necessarily exist. The producer may improve its actual profits at the expense
of a deterioration in the expected utility of consumers. So, the regulator should be
expected to use a modified BM mechanism allowing the producer to pre-donate in the
interim stage only if the outcome of this mechanism yields a higher expected utility
to consumers than obtained under the BM mechanism. This however can be true
only if the pre-donation rate k is less than the threshold level k < k̄(α), as implied
by Proposition 3-(i). In that case, P γ(λk,2(SR), dR) would lie on PO(λk,2(SR), dR)).
Together with equation (34), this would imply
P γ1 (λ
k,2(SR), dR) = W1(α̃(α, k)) + kW2(α̃(α, k)). (35)
Since P γ1 (λ
k,2(SR), dR) = γP γ2 (λ
k,2(SR), dR), equations (34) and (35) together imply
W1(α̃) + kW2(α̃) = γ(1− k)W2(α̃), (36)
where α̃ ≡ α̃(α, k). The above equation is satisfied only if






So, using (12) along with (28), we can write the problem of the producer as
max
k∈[0,1]













subject to the constraint k < k̄(α) = 1 − 1/(2 − α)2 and equation (37) over the
parameter values where α̃ ∈ [0, 1] is satisfied. We solve the above optimization problem
with the help of a computer. In Figure 5, we plot the set of (θ, α) pairs that satisfy the
aforementioned constraints faced by the producer in the interim stage. We observe that
if α is zero, any θ inside the set [0, 0.520] is consistent with the modified BMmechanism,
and this set becomes wider and wider as α increases and eventually coincides with the
unit interval when α becomes 1.
Next, we look for the solution to the constrained maximization problem in (38)
over the set of (θ, α) pairs satisfying the constraints of the producer. As the first-order
condition is not analytically conclusive, we will make simulations for various values of α.
Here, we will denote the producer’s optimal choice of pre-donation rate in the interim
stage by kI∗ to distinguish it from its optimal choice k∗ made in the ex-ante stage.
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Recall that when α = 1, the firm has no incentive to make pre-donation since α̃(α, k)
cannot exceed 1. So excluding α = 1 (and the Dictatorial-2 rule associated thereof), we
consider in our simulations four values of α in the set {0, 1/2, 2/3, 3/4} corresponding
to the rules in the set {Dictatorial-1, Egalitarian, Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky}.
Figure 5. The Set of (c1, δ) Pairs Supporting Equilibrium in the Interim Stage









The results portrayed in Figure 6 contain many findings. First, as shown by panel
(i), under all four rules the producer’s optimal pre-donation rate kI∗ chosen in the
interim stage is equal to the optimal value k∗ = 2(1 − α)/(3 − 2α) it would choose
in the ex-ante stage if θ is sufficiently small (not exceeding the middle values of θ in
the unit interval) and zero otherwise. In result, the modified welfare weight α̃(α, kI∗)
becomes equal to 1 when kI∗ = k∗ and equal to α when kI∗ = 0, as shown in panel
(ii). Thus, there exists a small range of θ values which are low enough, less than
θ∗(α̃(α, kI∗), to warrant the operation of the producer but also high enough to imply
that the producer chooses not to donate (kI∗ = 0). Panels (iii) and (iv) illustrate
the actual producer and consumer welfares when the pre-donation rate is zero and
the modified mechanism coincides with the BM mechanism. We observe that both
welfares always decrease with θ as theoretically predicted. However, the welfare effect
of a change in α, and equivalently a change in the bargaining rule, is different for the
two parties. The producer could rank the four bargaining rules (associated with four α
values) from the best to the worst as KS, Nash, Egalitarian, and Dictatorial-1, whereas
consumers would rank them in the reverse direction.
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Figure 6. The Welfare Effects of Pre-donation in the Interim Stage







Dictatorial-1 (α = 0) Egalitarian (α = 1/2)
Nash (α = 2/3) KS (α = 3/4)













(iii) Actual Producer Welfare (k = 0)





(iv) Actual Consumer Welfare (k = 0)







(v) Actual Producer Welfare (k = kI∗)







(vi) Actual Consumer Welfare (k = kI∗)
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(vii) Gain in Actual Producer Welfare





(viii) Gain in Actual Consumer Welfare







(ix) Actual Social Welfare (k = 0)







(x) Actual Social Welfare (k = kI∗)





(xi) Gain in Actual Social Welfare





(xii) Gain in Actual Social Welfare (% of ν(θ))
Notice that the effects of θ and α on the actual welfares appear in the interim stage
too, as we can inspect in panels (v) and (vi) of Figure 6. We should, however, observe
that in the interim stage the modified BM mechanism reduces the effect of α on the
actual producer welfare and eliminates the effect of θ on the actual consumer welfare
when θ is not high. Comparing panels (v) and (vi) with the previous two panels, we
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calculate in the next two panels the actual welfare gains. Panel (vii) shows that the
producer always benefits from pre-donating when θ is not too high. On the other hand,
as shown in the next panel, consumers suffer from the producer’s pre-donation if θ is
low (nearly less than 0.4 or so) and benefit from it otherwise, as long as the producer
is allowed to operate. In the last four panels, we consider the social welfare analysis.
Panels (ix) and (x) together show that the modification of the BM mechanism by al-
lowing the producer to pre-donate in the interim stage increases the variance of the
social welfare with respect to α at low values of θ and reduces this variance other-
wise. Finally, the last two panels show (in utility levels and percentage terms) that
the actual social welfare always decreases (though not extremely) at low values of θ
and substantially increases at high values of θ. Indeed, the last panel illustrates that
when the percentage increase can be almost as high as 100% under all four bargaining
rules when θ is sufficiently high. This result suggests that the lower the efficiency of
the monopolist, the higher the ex-post social benefit we obtain from the modified BM
mechanism. The welfare results summarized above imply the following existence result.
Proposition 7. There exist α ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, a) such that by allowing the pro-
ducer to optimally pre-donate in the interim stage under the modified BM mechanism
the regulator can increase the actual (ex-post) welfare of both consumers and the pro-
ducer.
The simulations in Figure 6 suggest that the set of θ values for which Proposition
7 holds is a continuum. These simulations also suggest that the set of α values leading
to the predicted welfare gains must contain the set {0, 1/2, 2/3, 3/4} corresponding
to four bargaining rules considered in Figure 6. Moreover, the continuity of the BM
mechanism and of its modified version imply that the set of α for which Proposition 7
holds must be a continuum, too. In fact, our additional simulations not reported in this
study suggest that as long as α < 1, one can always predict to find some measurable
range of θ values under which the studied modification for the BM mechanism leads
to ex-post welfare improvements for both the producer and consumers.
Finally, we should notice that the optimal pre-donation rate kI∗ of the producer
in the interim stage is not independent of θ. Thus, it reveals information about the
producer’s private costs. The producer can avoid the consequences of this unintentional
revelation, prior to the planned cost revelation, if it can make a contractual agreement
with the regulator to prevent her from exploiting any information revealed by pre-
donation. To see whether such an agreement would be plausible for the regulator,
36
we should recall that in calculating the optimal interim pre-donation rate kI∗ of the
producer, we restricted ourselves to a domain where each pre-donation level was ex-
ante admissible by the regulator and consumers, consequently ensuring kI∗ < k̄(α).
As long as the contractual agreement between the producer and the regulator enforces
the pre-donation rate in the interim stage to lie below the threshold level k̄(α), the
regulator may have incentive to sign this contract as it increases the expected consumer
welfare whenever the producer chooses to pre-donate.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a Pareto-improving modification for the BM mecha-
nism. The modification allows consumers and the monopolist to make –in the ex-ante
or interim stage of the regulatory process– contingent utility transfers (pre-donations)
between themselves to ensure a bilaterally beneficial improvement upon the expected
social welfare function selected by the regulator in the BM mechanism.
We have proved that under the modified regulatory mechanism any amount of
pre-donation by the producer in the ex-ante stage always leads to an ex-ante Pareto
improvement, while a certain amount of it completely eliminates expected deadweight
loss. Moreover, the optimal pre-donation of the producer in the interim stage may
lead under some cost parameters to an ex-post Pareto improvement. Consumers, on
the other hand, have never any incentive to make a unilateral pre-donation, nor to
reverse the optimal pre-donation of the monopolist.
An important assumption we have made in modifying the BM mechanism is that
the regulator can make a perfectly binding commitment preventing herself from us-
ing any information that may be revealed by the monopolist’s pre-donation to update
her prior beliefs about the monopolist’s private cost information or to change the
revelation mechanism borrowed from BM. This assumption has no bite when the mo-
nopolist makes pre-donation in the ex-ante stage. This is because the monopolist’s
pre-donation turns out to be independent of its private cost information, revealing no
undesired information to the regulator. On the other hand, if the monopolist is allowed
to pre-donate in the interim stage, its decision as to whether it should pre-donate be-
comes a function of its private cost information. Hence, the monopolist unintentionally
reveals some cost information to the regulator before the actual revelation takes place,
endangering some part of the informational rents it expects to earn from the regula-
tory process. However, the regulator has an incentive to be blind to any information
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revealed by pre-donation in the interim stage, as she can verifiably ensure that the
optimal pre-donation of the monopolist should be increasing the expected utility of
consumers. On the other hand, if the regulator chooses to exploit the information re-
vealed by pre-donation, then the modified mechanism we propose would no longer be
incentive-compatible. The monopolist would have incentives to revise its pre-donation
decision strategically to limit the information revealed thereof and also to manipulate
its cost report at certain values of its private cost parameter to make it comply with
the announced pre-donation. We leave the characterization of the optimal regulatory
mechanism in that case and the induced equilibrium pre-donation by the producer for
future research.
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